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Abstract 
There has bcen reccnt interest, for purposes of public 
decision-making, in the quantification of certain variables 
which have no directly observable market price. The 
quantification or "pricing" of one such variable, the in- 
crezse cr decrease in human mortality, is useful for 
decisions related to standard-setting and public programs. 
This paper presents a survey of four basic methodolo- 
gies which have been suggested for making this quantifi- 
cation. The historical development of each approach is 
traced, selected case studies are presented and the limi- 
tations of the methods are reviewed. Plans for continuing 
research in this area are smn;larized. 
I. Introduction 
With the recent popularity, primarily in the United 
States and in France, of cost/benefit analysis as a method for 
evaluating government programs, and with the current interest 
in "quality of life" as an alternative to purely growth cri- 
teria, the need to "quantify" intangible social costs and 
benefits has become apparent. One such intagible cost or bene- 
fit (defined as having no directly observable market value) is 
the loss or saving of human life (or the decrease or increase 
in human mortality). Although at present there is much debate 
and, in some cases, a certain vagueness or "mystique" concerning 
this ccncept of valuing human lives, it has a long history, and 
various methodologies for its practical application have been 
evolved. It is the purpose of this survey to trace the develop- 
ment and application of these techniques for evaluating life- 
saving or life-risking programs. 
There is a wide range of public decisions which potentially 
affect human mortality. Public investment alternatives which 
have a possible safety or health impact (e.g. the choice between 
transportation options, energy options, etc.) or health and safety 
standards (e.g. seat belts, radioactivity releases, etc.) have a 
direct or indirect impact on population mortality rates. If the 
investment options are characterized by multiple impacts, and 
if the standards involve changes in one of many technically inter- 
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dependent impacts, then any decision technique which balances 
negative and positive performance requires that these impacts 
be weighted in some manner. A "judgemental" weighting by the 
decision-maker (cost-effectiveness, or judgemental, approach) 
is one possibility. In the case of cost/benefit analysis,l the 
impacts must be reduced to a scalar, usually by expressing each 
in monetary units. Another possibility is to rank, in some 
manner, the preferences for each impact (possibly in "utiles") 
and select the projects according to some societal welfare 
function. In general, this literature survey includes appli- 
cations developed for cost/benefit analysis, aUquantification" 
of "life values". Some recent theoretical literature, also 
included, pertains to the specification of societal preferences 
related to changes in mortality. 
Four distinct approaches for quantifying human life values 
have been identified. The earliest, and currently most applied 
--- the "human-capital approach" which values a life in accor- 
dance with its potential for future productivity--has gained b;ide 
popularity because of the apparent ease in its quantification. 
A second approach, to quantify life values according to some 
implicit value observable in societal acceptance of both public 
and private risks of death, has had some recent attention but 
very little application. A th'ird approach, which has received 
some mention in the literature, is to relate "life values" 
either to the life-insurance purchases or to judicial awards for 
mortality cases. The last and most recently developed approach, 
to value a life-saving or life-risking program according to the 
"risk" to which the population is exposed and the willingness of 
the population to pay to avoid this risk, has been extensively 
treated in the literature. However, contrary to the human- 
capital approach, the criteria necessary for the risk approach 
are not easily quantifiable, and thus its applicability is still 
questioned. 
The survey will be divided into four sections corresponding 
to the four methodologies. Each will be discussed with reference 
to the historical development, the applications, and, finally, 
the appropriateness of the approach for public decision-making. 
All references, unless otherwise specified, will relate to 
experience in the United States. 
11. The Human-Capital Approach 
The most traditional and currently most expedient method 
for valuing a human life is the human-capital approach, based on 
the premise that a man's worth to society depends on his produc- 
tivity. Man is regarded as a productive unit, as human capital. 
In some cases, such as witnessed in the United States slave markets 
of the 19th century, the "market price" of a man reflected the 
capitalized value of the productive capacity of the last or 
marginal slave.2 The "slave value" was the value of a man as a 
I It is not the purpose here to critique cost/benefit proce- 
dures as a tool for public decision-making. There is a welfare 
basis (Mishan "Cost-Benefit Analysis") for such an approach, but 
only insofar as it relates to "efficiency" criteria; i.e. distri- 
butional impacts are ignored. 
2 ~ o r  a discussion see Fogel and Engerman, "The Economics of 
Slavery," 1971. 
machine--the price of capital equipment with expected future 
returns and costs over its (his) production; as such it was 
analogous to the human-capital measure which will be discussed 
in this section. 
Historically, the human-capital approach has taken two forms. 
The first, the "net" approach, values man only insofar as he con- 
tributes to the rest of society, excluding himself. An individ- 
ual's total contribution (value) is calculated by capitalizing 
to the present his earnings net of his consumption or "maintenance" 
costs. The second approach, thengross" value of a man, includes 
the individual himself in society by not excluding his own 
consumption. The background, applications, and recent critiques 
of both approaches will be presented in this section. 
The "Net" Value 
The net value of an individual has been defined as that 
amount of his capitalized earnings which accrue not ko himself 
but to others. Man is viewed as capital, his value being cal- 
culated by deducting from his capitalized earnings the sum of 
his future discounted consumption or his "maintenance" costs. 
Such a measure is ex post in that it excludes the person himself 
from society's welfare and includes only the economic losses 
suffered by others upon his demise. 
This approach was first developed for the purpose of cal- 
culating the amount of life insurance a man must purchase to be 
considered "fully insured"3 (Woods and Hetzgar, 1927; Dublin 
and Lotka, 1946). This was thought to mean being insured to the 
full value of the portion of a man's expected earnings that 
accrues to his dependents. According to Dublin and Lotka, 
interest in a man's value only to his dependents justifies such 
a calculation: "We are concerned here with man as a wage- 
earner or salaried worker ..... If such a man is removed by 
death, his family suffers, emotionally, a loss which escapes 
our powers of evaluation in figures, and with which we are, 
therefore, not concerned. But the family suffers, in addition, 
an economic loss, for which a fairly definite estimate in 
dollars and cents can be given." (p.3) 
The concept of placing an economic value on a human life 
can be traced as far back as early Anglo-Saxon Law (see Dublin 
and Lotka, p.71, according to which, in the event of a murder, 
the slayer was liable to the victim's family for the amount of 
the "wer". Thewwer" was an arbitrary appraisal but varied with 
the social class of the victim. Indirectly, it thus had some 
relation to his earnings or "economic worth". A more explicit 
'~ctuall~, Adams (1974) reports on the first person to use 
such a calculation. Johnathan Swift, in 1729, in a brief essay 
titled "A Modest Proposal", demonstrated that the value of human 
life was simply a function of supply and demand. The optimal time 
to end it was that at which the selling price minus the cost of 
production was at a maximum which he computed to be one year. 
calculation of the value of a man was made by William ~ a r r ~  in 
1853. Interested in determining a mzn's "capital value" as a 
base for a human property tax, he computed the value of a typical 
individual of given earning capacity by taking the present worth 
of average future earnings (future earning minus personal cost 
of living) .5 
The net value of man has since been used to calculate 
"societal" losses from both diseases and accidents. Selma 
Mushkin (1962), in her extensive review of the literature on 
health investment, refers to the developmental-cost concept, 
according to which man is viewed as a capital asset, and the 
rearing of children thus as an investment in capital.6 All the 
costs of child rearing, including food and clothing, are com- 
prised in the investment outlay.7 At about the turn of the 
century, Irving Fisher (1909) became interested in the social 
benefits of increased health expenditure and the social costs 
of dimease and illness. One of the costs of disease, the cost 
of premature death, he quantified by adapting the Farr procedure 
to U.S. data. Fisher did not, however, accept this monetary 
estimate without reservation. "Although the figures for national 
losses strike the popular imagination, they have little signifi- 
cance; in fact, money estimates in this field, even when made on 
4~illiam Farr, Journal of the Statistical Society, as dis- 
cussed by Dublin and Lotka, 1946, p.12. 
5 ~ h i s  mehtod has since been duplicated by R. Ludtge (Deutsche 
Versicherungs-Zeitung) as quoted by fublin and Lotka, 1946, p.13, 
who was again concerned with "insurance value" and expressly speaks 
of this pecuniary measure as relating only to the family and other 
interested persons. 
6~ealth expenditure affects both the quality and length of 
life. Increased health expenditure enhances human capital by 
increasing both the number of persons and their productive capacity. 
In this way it is related to both safety and education. 
7 ~ h e  attributes use of this approach to Contellon in his 
essay "The Nature of Commerce in General" (1775), to Quetelet 
(1835), and to Chadwick (1842) who, in his report on the Sanitary 
Conditions of the Labouring Population in Great Britain, estab- 
lished the idea of health programs as an integral part of economic 
policy. Mushkin quotes Chadwick as writing, "The economist for the 
advancement of his science may well treat the human being simply 
as an investment of capital. . . . " (p. 149) . 
the per capita basis, are of little value except as emphasizing 
the overwhelming importance of human vitality compared with 
those interests which are usually measured in money. It is 
impossible in any true sense to measure human life in terms of 
dollars and cents. " (p. 124) Finally, Burton Weisbrod (-1961) ,
interested in the allocation of medical research amongst 
various deseases, quantified, as part of the social cost of each 
disease, the cost of premature death. He was interested in the 
monetary loss to society as a whole: " .... the loss of life 
involves the loss of an actual or potential productive unitv 
(p.33). Unique to his calculation, Weisbrod includes the cost 
of premature burial. 
Prior to Weisbrod, a net value cakulation of losses from 
premature death appeared in 1956, when D.J. Reynolds, a British 
economist, estimated the social costs of deaths due to automobile 
accidents. He thought that loss of life should be addressed in 
two parts: the pain, fear and suffering imposed by the occurrence, 
or risk of occurrence, of road accidents; and the more concrete 
burdens of the net loss of output of goods and services. He 
cautions, however, "that for a variety of reasons it is beyond 
the competence of the economist to assign objective values to the 
losses suffered under the former" (p.393). He thus confines his 
analysis to the latter, calculating the net loss by first multi- 
plying the average annual output per head by the expected working 
life of each age group and then deducting the average consumption 
per head. His method differs from Farrls and Fisher's, not in 
principle, but because he uses average rather than marginal output. 
As recently as 1966, the net income approach has been used to 
calculate losses from accidents. In a special report prepared 
under contract for the Systems Research and Development Service 
(SRDS) by the Flight Safety Foundation (1966), it was estimated 
that the aggregate costs--aircraft damage, injury and fatality-- 
of general aviation accidents (U.S.) in 1964 was $321.8 million. 
Of this amount, $268.1 million represented the cost of 977 
general aviation fatalities. Each fatality was valued at an average 
of $274,000 as the "deceased's worth to his family", a figure 
which represented two-thirds of his estimated total income for 
the 25 years of his remaining productive life. In this report 
it is stated: "Other values of human life have been suggested 
by other sources but there are no positive measures. All figures 
seem to be subject to interpretation." (p. 6) 
The latest mention of using a "net expected earnings" approach 
can be found in Simon Rotenberg's 1968 discussion on the benefit 
of saftey: " .... the cost of death is the sum of the values of the 
deceased person's expected contribution to the output of the 
8 ~ n  his discussion of capitalizing earning power, Fisher cites 
an earlier study by Mayo Smith ("Statistics and Sociology"), who 
estimated that men and women between the ages of 15 and 45 averaged 
$1,000 in value, and that every imigrant must then represent a 
certain labour value--at least the value of a slave: $875. Further, 
the late Honorable Carol D. Wright,whom fisher quotes as a man 
"whose opinion was worth more, probably, than that of any other 
man in the United States", stated that he would not regard $1,000 
as excessive (Fisher, p. 118) . 
economy, if he had not lost his life, perhaps net of his expec- 
ted consumption, the resources employed in medical therapy prior 
to his death, the administrative costs of relevant insurance 
schemes, the difference between the cost of early and late burial, 
and the grief of surviving kinfolk" (p.491). 
Most of the analysts who have used the net value approach 
have been careful to specify that it is a measure of economic 
loss accruing to the family or to society only; yet many writers 
have been offended at the suggestion that this measure might re- 
flect the entire loss to society associated with the death of one 
of its members. As an example, Ely Devons (1961) dubs this 
approach as "....quantification gone mad", and continues: 
"Estimating the 'net loss' to the community in this way leads, 
for example, to the fantastic result that if we could have more 
road accidents in which we succeeded in knocking down and killing 
old people we should reduce the 'net loss.' .... It is indeed a 
sad commentary on the state of public conscience if we have to 
be persuaded that measures to reduce road accidents will pay, in 
some economic sense, before we will listen seriously." (pp. 107, 
108) 
Devons was referring specifically to Reynolds' study on the 
cost of road accidents. Although Reynolds had stated that his 
estimates of human life were only a minimum, Devons was appre- 
hensive over the possible implications of ignoring the indivi- 
dual's demand for his own life and the psychic costs involved. 
This apprehension was evidenced as early as 1909 when John Mill 
commented on Adam Smith's concept of human capital or "useful 
abilities": "The human being himself I do not class as wealth. 
He is the purpose for which wealth exists. But his acquired 
capacities, which exist only as a means, and have been called into 
existence by labour, fall rightly, as it seems to me, within that 
designation. "9 . 
The Gross Value 
It was thought by some analysts that a gross value, one that 
includes total output of the individual that he and others con- 
sume, is a better measure to reflect social value. Rashi Fein 
(1958) was the first to discuss the pros and cons of the two 
approaches: "This (the net value) may appear a rather cold- 
hearted approach, for it implies that the family is 'better off' 
if a retired parent (not producing, hut consuming) dies. The 
reader must remember that our discussion is limited to values 
as expressed in dollars and that, as long as we do not measure 
'psychic values,' .... the family is 'better off' in dollars and 
cents." (p.15) Acknowledging that Dublin and Lotka's figures are 
'~ohn Stuart Mill, 'Principles of Political Economy,' as 
quoted by Dublin and Lotka, 1946, p.12. 
correct for their purposes, he prefers, however, to use total 
income, because the individual himself is part of society's wel- 
fare. The consumption by the individual is an end in itself. 
"Assume a bachelor earns five thousand dollars a year in an 
economy without taxes. Assume, further, that his consumption 
expenditures per annum are five thousand dollars; savings, thus, 
are zero. Is this individual's net worth to society zero (five 
thousand produced minus five thousand consumed)? This would 
hardly seem to be the case. On the five thousand dollars income 
the individual enjoys life, and it is for this purpose that the 
social economy exists." (p.18-19) 
Fein was not the first to use gross earnings as a measure of 
a man's social worth in terms of output. In 1699, Sir William 
Petty used such a measure to estimate the value of every head in 
England : 
Suppose the People of England be Six Millions in number, 
that their Expence at 6 7  per Head be Forty Two Millions; 
suppose also that the rent of the Lands be Eight Millions, 
and the yearly profit of all the Personal Estate be Eight 
Millions more; it must needs follow, that the Labour of 
the People must have supplied the remaining Twenty Six 
Millions, the which multipled by Twenty (the Mass of 
Mankind being worth Twenty Years purchase as well as 
Land) makes Five Hundred and Twenty Millions, as the 
value of the whole People; which number divided by Six 
Millions, makes above Ti80 to be the value of each Head 
of Man, Woman and Child, and of adult persons twice as 
much; from whence we may learn to compute the loss we 
have sustained by the plague, by the slaughter of men 
in war, and by sending them abroad into the service of 
foreign princes.10 
Petty's estimate, although crude, is based on a man's average 
product capitalized over 20 years. He makes no allowance for the 
maintenance of the workers. 
The more recent literature in which an estimate for the 
productive value of a man appears begins with a 1958 study 
prepared for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) by 
United Research Inc. To estimate the value of preventing the 
death of an air carrier passenger, the discounted value of the 
average passenger's expected income, $185,000, is considered 
appropriate. This is one of the earliest cost/benefit analyses 
of a project which involves the possible saving of lives. The 
authors are somewhat reluctant, however, to "quantify" the 
benefits. "Although there is no real justification for treating 
a lost life in terms of dollar values, nonetheless it is useful 
to place as many of the factors involved in as common terms as 
possible" (p. 59) . 
losir William Petty, "Political Arithmetic, or a Discourse 
Concerning the Extent and Value of Lands, People, Building, etc," 
as quoted by Dublin and Lotka, pp.8-9. For a discussion, see 
Dublin and Lotka, 1946, p.14. 
In the early sixties, as cost/benefit studies grew in pop- 
ularity, it became increasingly important to quantify the bene- 
fits from saving lives. Carlson (1965) was one of the first to 
address the problem of saving lives from an economist's point of 
view, or in the more general framework of resource allocation. 
The allocation of funds to life-saving should, at least, be efficient 
in equating on the margin the dollar expenditure per life saved. 
To promote more rational decision-making, Carlson advocates use of 
the human capital approach. He admits many short-comings of the 
measure, but suggests that at least, as a first approximation, 
the human capital approach may be better than what is being used. 
A refinement of the gross measure, and the most comprehensive 
to date, is contained in a 1962 study by Gary Fromm. Acknowledging 
that his concern is for the derivation of guidelines useful for 
investment decisions, Fromm reasons that a more comprehensive 
measure than simple pecuniary losses is necessary, one which allows 
the government to maximize the welfare of all its constituents. 
"Consideration of this problem flows from the view that in our 
society it is important for the government to attempt to maximize 
the welfare of all its constituents. Welfare here includes not 
only material factors, but also all the non-economic satisfactions 
which the individual may attain. Ideally, then, in constructing 
a measure of value for a human life, insofar as possible, one should 
take account of both economic and non-economic factors". (p.vi-43) 
Unfortunately, however, Fromrn makes no attempt to include the non- 
economic factors in his measure; on the other hand he is the first 
to devise a more comprehensive base of economic losses resulting 
from a death. For the case of an air fatality, Fromm includes 
the loss to the individual himself (his discounted expected 
earnings), the loss to his family (2/3 of the discounted earnings), 
the loss to his community, his employer, the government (in taxes), 
and the airlines.11 
Fromm emphasizes that these figures are by no means inclusive 
of all losses due to an air fatality, but can only serve as a 
minimum to the relevant figure; yet these calculations have since 
been considered as somewhat of an upper limit.12 In a report 
prepared in 1962 by E. Bollay Associates under contract for the 
Systems Research Development Services (SRDS), a value of $251,000 
for a general aviation fatality is calculated. They make note of 
the Fromm study but choose to use only the present value of the 
average stream of future earnings. In 1965, an in-house SRDS 
report again assigned a value of $250,000, using the same pro- 
cedure as developed in the Bollay report. In 1965, the 
Institute for Defense Analysis, in a study of the North ~tlantic 
 he average cost of an air carrier fatality in 1960 was 
determined to be $373,000 and of a general aviation fatality 
$422,000. 
12contrast this approach with the 1966 FSF report already 
discussed, in which a net income figure was used-- the economic 
loss accruing to the family only. 
Air Traffic Control System, took the F r o m  estimate as an upper 
limit to the value of an air fatality, the Bollay estimate as a 
medium-range estimate, and the liability limit prescribed by 
the 1929 Hague Protocol ($16,000) as a lower limit.13 There 
was no anal sis of the relative validity of these alternative 
estimates. 1% 
The FAA has been the most prolific in the development and 
use of a measure for the value of life, but others have also been 
interested. One of the most careful and rigorous studies in valu- 
ing human lives for program analyses was a 1967 report prepared 
for the Social Security Administration by Dorothy Rice 8nd 
Barbara Cooper. Using various rates of discount they calculate 
by age and sex the expected. value of an individual's future 
earnings, again limiting the analysis to productive capacity. 
They comment that "these are by no means the only measures of the 
value of human life". (p. 1954) 
In 1970, two studies were published on the economic costs 
of air pollution, both necessarily dealing with a value of life. 
In the tradition of Weisbrod, the costs of various diseases, 
including the cost of mortality, were calculated. In the first 
study, "The Economic Costs of Air Pollution," Ronald Ridker 
calculated essentially the same measure as did Weisbrod, the 
gross loss in expected earnings plus the costs of premature 
burial. The second, a study by Lester Lave and E.P. Seskin, 
expanded the scope of aiseases covered by Ridkor, but used 
essentially the same measure, excluding the cost of premature 
burial. This estimate, however, was considered by the authors 
to be very conservative, "For conceptual meaning it should 
reflect not expected earnings but willingness-to-pay by the 
individual for improved longevity. The sum of income lost is 
a gross underestimate of willingness-to-pay." (p.37) 
Cohen, in 1970, was the first to introduce the concept 
of life values to be used in evaluating safeguards for atomic 
energy applications. He suggests that $250 is the sum necessary 
to compensate an individual for accepting one rem of radiation 
exposure, a figure which is "....reascnably indicative of 
potential lifetime earning capacity." (p.13) Since Cohen 
assumes that 1,000 rems is the lethal dose and that the human 
effects of irradiation are linear with respect to dose, the 
13~here is now an effort to increase this limit to $100,000 
or possibly $150,000. 
14For further comments on the Bollay, SPDS, and IDA reports, 
see Lanka and Gansle, "The Problem of Dollar Values for Air 
Traveller Safety", 1967. In their words, all these measures 
have'lreflected a mixture of uneasiness and resignation in 
estimating the value of lives saved--implying a mistrust of the 
rationale for evaluating fatalities as presented in prior 
reports; acknowled-ging an inability to develop scientifically 
valid new estimates; and using some on-the-shelf data, with 
or without adjustment, as reasonable approximations." (p.7) 
implied life value i.s $250,000. Lederberg (1971) calculated 
life values by estimating the fraction of the U.S. national 
health bill attributable to genetic mutations caused by back- 
ground radiation. A death was treated as a loss in work time 
plus some additional medical expenses. Because of the 
uncertainties involved, he calculates values ranging from $50,000 
to $1 million for a human life, depending on the age at which 
the death occurs. On this procedure he comments, "This kind 
of cost-accounting is morally insufferable, but we must find some 
de facto standard of value in making hard decisions." (p.4) 
Otway et al. (1971) were the first to apply such a life value 
estimate in the calculation of a cost/benefit ratio for a 
large-scale muclear project. 
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has only recently 
considered. using monetary life values. Such a calculation 
can be found in a draft report scheduled for publication in 
1975. It is reasoned that the cost to society of one man-day 
lost is approximately $50, a figure which is somewhat 
arbitrary but reportedly reflects average earnings ($15/day), 
med.ica1 and funeral expenses, and. effects on family life. 
Since the loss of a life is on the average equivalent to 
6,000 man-days lost, the life equivalent cost is $900,000. 
But it is cautioned that the figures are "arbitrary, assigned 
to permit rough comparisons, and carry with then. no implied 
comment on the absolute value of a human life." (p.1-26) 
The ].atest AEC report (1974) , known as .the Rasmussen report, 
makes no calculations for the monetary value of avoiding possible 
risks of life. 
A final area to be discussed in which a value of life has 
been develope6 is that of automobile safety. In 1972, the White 
House Office of Science and Technology estimated the average cost 
of a traffic death to be $140,000. This figure was based on the 
per capita income in the United States multiplied by the average 
number of ears of life foregone as a result of a traffic 
fatality. 1x This average figure was reportedly used because 
it values all lives equally and avoids questions of the 
economic value of one life versus another.16 In the words of 
Howard Gates, who served on the White House Study: "If you had 
an Ed Cole f~resident of General Motors) killed, that would cost 
the economy much more than, say, one Ralph Nader because Nader 
didn't earn so much. Neither one of them would accept that." 
(Washington Post, 1972) This $140,000 figure resulted in 
unfavorable cost/benefit ratios for both air pollution standards 
and the proposed requirement for airbags; it resulted in more 
favorable ratios for other safety devises such as seat belts. 
1 5 ~ h e  National safety Council, in a memo dated July, 1971, 
set this value at $45,000 (based on discussions with Ed Wright, 
NSC, July, 1974). 
16compare this with the F r o m  study which set the cost of 
a general aviation fatality higher than that of an air carrier 
fatality. 
In 1972, shortly after the RECAT report, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) did a compre- 
hensive study titled "Societal Costs of Motor Vehicle Accidents". 
Their objective was to include - all quantifiable economic costs 
af a traffic fatality. Included were property damage ($1,5001, 
medical costs ($1,125), funeral costs ($goo), legal and court 
costs ($3,000), wage losses ($132,000), miscellaneous costs 
($200) , insurance administration ($4,700) , losses to others 
($1,300), employer losses ($1,000), community services ($7,0001, 
pain suffering ($10,000) 17, home and family duties ($33,0001, 
and assets ($5,000). The total cost per fatality was, then, 
$200,725. The largest item included, wage losses, was again 
calculated by discounting to the present average expected 
earnings. This approach differs from the From calculation 
in that a portion of the wage bill is not double-counted as an 
additional loss to the family. The item "losses to others" 
included, for example, the time lost by relatives travelling 
to the hospital or to the funeral. 
The NHTSA report epitomizes all past efforts to value a 
life economically. They recognized their efforts, however, as 
a quantification of only those costs which are directly or in- 
directly quantifiable--not as a "value of life". 
Our approach was to identify and present quantitative 
estimates of as many losses associated with motor 
vehi.cl.e accidents as possible. We have not quantified 
all losses associated with the traqedy of a highway 
accident. We have not placed a vaiue-on a human life, 
and we are not arguing that it is unwise t.o spend more 
than the a.mounts calculated .... We wish to em~hasize 
that placing a value on a human life can be nothing 
more than a play with figures. We have provided an 
estimate of some of the quantifiable losses in societal 
welfare resulting from a fatality and can only hope 
that this estimate is not construed as some type of 
basis for determining the "optimal" or even worse, 
the "maximum" amount of expenditure to be allocated 
to saving lives. (NHTSA, 1972, A-1, A-3). 
In spite of this warning, decisions have been and are being 
made on the basis of the $200,000 figure. For example, in a 
1974 Department of Transportation report. evaluating the pro- 
posed underride guards for trucks, it was estimated that 180 
deaths per annum would be prevented at $200,000 per death for 
a total benefit of $36 million (for fatalities only). The 
costs were estimated at $310 million. Thus, the proposal was 
rejected. Similar analysis, again using $200,000 per life, is 
currently being prepared by the Department of Transportation 
on the feasibility of mandatory use of seat belts. 
17calculated from insurance settlements. 
Critique 
In the last sections, we have traced the development of the 
human capital approach to life evaluation, from its original 
intent of evaluating life-insurance decisions and calculating 
ex post accident losses to its present status as a tool for 
evaluating investments which potentially risk or save lives. 
In the latter application, we have noted the dissatisfaction on 
the part of most policy-makers. For example, Dublin and Lotka, 
one of the first to develop such a methodology, reflected the 
setiment of most of their predecessors: "All estimates of 
losses to the community obtained by some elementary process of 
totaling losses to wage earners, immediate families, or the like, 
must be viewed with extreme reserve."l8 In general, it has been 
regarded as a measure for the minimum expense which society can 
justifiably undergo to save a life. It has never been suggested 
that it represents an optimal measure from the standpoint of 
societal welfare. 
Thedia and Abraham (1961), both French engineers, were the 
first to state explicitly that the measure was not appropriate 
for evaluating projects ex ante which affect human lives ex post. 
In other words, they question making a decision which in the 
future might affect a man's life, based on criteria which 
presumes that the man is already deceased. On the question of how 
much a community should spend to save a life, they comment, 
"....neither the calculations taken from the insurance companies 
nor strictly economic calculations make it possible to give a 
strict reply to this question. .... it does not follow that 
because the death of an individual costs the community nothing, 
no attempt should be made to avoid it." (p.590) 
Somewhat later, in a second French publication, by Rdsch (19611, 
the human-capital approach was again criticized. "Even in a 
strictly economic context, a relationship can be established 
between the product of a human being and the price of life only 
if man is considered as a factor of production, but this 
relationship does not hold if life is considered a necessity". 
(p. 137) 
Schelling (1967) was the first to discuss comprehensively 
the problem of evaluating loss of life and limb for the purpose 
of government expenditure. He rejects the human-capital approach, 
suggesting that expected income, except insofar as it is part 
of the data which go into making individual tradeoffs on risk and 
income, has little to do with the value of one's life. In ~chelling's 
words, "there is no reason to suppose that what a man would pay 
to eliminate some specific probability, P, of his own death is 
more than, less than, or equal to, P times his discounted 
expected earnings. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that a 
man's future earnings. discounted in any pertinent fashion, bear 
any particular relation to what he would pay to reduce some 
likelihood of his own death." (p.149) Schelling emphasizes 
I8~ublin and Lotka (1946, p.327). 
the individual's interest in decreasing his own risk of death, or, 
synonymously, increasing his life expectancy. He calls this the 
consumer interest. Once a program to save lives has been 
identified, it is relevant to determine what it is worth to the 
consumers or the people who stand to benefit from it. It should 
be their privilege, according to Schelling, to have the program 
if they are collectively willing to bear the costs. 
It is interesting to note that a Federal Aviation Adminis- 
tratjon staff report (Lanka and Gansle, 1967), written shortly 
after the publication of the Schelling article, recommended 
consideration of a study effort along the lines suggested by 
Schelling, including discontinuation of the use of the human 
capital approach. 
Remaining lifetime earnings must be regarded as an 
invalid measure of even the minimum value of a life 
saved. What, then, is the significance of lifetime 
earnings for valuing lives saved? The conclusion here 
is that it can serve to measure in its net form the 
economic value of a life saved to other people only, 
i.e. to society. This value of itself is only a 
small and poor reason to undertake safety programs, 
i.e., to protect the economic well-being of the 
statistical people whose lives are not at stake (p.37). 
Finally, Mishan (1971) has criticized both the gross and 
net capital approaches evaluating human life. The gross income 
approach which values lives according to the loss of potential 
future earnings, Mishan writes, "can be rationalized only if the 
criterion adopted in any economic reorganization turns on the 
value of its contribution to GNP, or more accurately, to net 
national product." (p.689) Such a measure is based not on the 
principle of in some sense maximizing societal welfarz or total 
"utility", but rather on maximizing output or production. It 
values livelihood and not lives. The net product approach, which 
values lives according to the loss of potential earnings net of 
consumption, is not satisfactory, according to Mishan, because 
it has no regard for the feelings of the potential decedents. 
It ignores society ex ante and concentrates wholly on society 
ex post." (p.680) 
These criticisms of the human-capital or life-time earnings 
approach are concisel-y summed up by Rappaport in Hirshleifer et 
al. (1974). He gives the following three grounds for rejecting 
the approach. 
1. The lifetime-earnings measure is deterministic. 
Actually, there is no theoretical basis for using such 
a measure, in the first place. But if there were, it 
would seem to refer to a conceptual experiment of trading 
"a life" for money. In practice, we are usually evaluating 
small increases in the probability of death. Clearly, our 
answer must come to grips with risk attitudes; and it is 
well known that uncertain losses are (usually) subjectively 
valued at larger than the statistical expectation. 
2. Lifetime-earnings takes no account of leisure. If 
there were no saving or borrowing, conssmption activity 
would be proportional to earnings and this problem would 
disappear. But the phenomenon of retirement places a 
severe burden on such a simplification. The human 
capital measure seems to undervalue old peoples' lives 
vis-a-vis working-age people. 
3. The lifetime-earnings measure does not include 
externalities. Many people feel loss from the death of 
another even though they derive no financial benefit 
from that person. (p.2,3) 
Implicit Societal Evaluation 
In the last section, the human-capital approach for valuing 
a human life was reviewed. Although it is currently the most 
popular method (U.S.) for evaluating public programs which affect 
human mortality, it is considered by economists to be inappro- 
priate as a quantification for purposes of a cost/benefit analysis. 
In this section, an alternative measure, an "implicit" societal 
evaluation, will be discussed. 
Since society, through its political processes, in fact 
makes decisions on investment expenditures which occasionally 
increase or decrease the number of deaths, an implicit value 
of human life can be calculated. Such a method requires no 
direct calculation of the loss of potential earnings or spending. 
Instead, it approaches the problem from a social point of view 
by estimating the expenditure society actually makes to save a 
life. If, for example, an arrangement is made that will increase 
safety, and save an estimated five lives, at a cost of $100,000, 
then the implicit value of a life is $20,000. 
Carlson (1963) was the first to calculate implicit life 
values. He reviews selected government programs, including the 
B-58 ejection system, in which the implicit value of life is 
somewhere between $1.7 and $9.0 million, and the emergency 
procedures for pilots flying jet fighters, in which the 
implicit value (for recommending ejection) is something greater 
than $270,000. Carlson's purpose, however, was not to suggest 
that these measures be used for making future investment 
decisions, but only to show that since the implicit values 
cover such a range, more efficient decisions could be made with 
a standardized "value of life".19 
Georges Morlat, a Professor at the Institute of Statistics 
of the University of Paris, dealt with the problem of life values 
in 1970, in connection with his research on medical decision- 
making. He suggests several methods, including the human-capital 
approach, for valuing a life, but for purposes of his analysis 
he chooses to use the "cost of protection accepted by a community 
to save anonymous persons." Hence, he uses an implicit valuation 
of life. 
19~romm, in 1965, again mentions the calculation of an implicit 
value, but only as a basis for comparing projects. This information 
he states, could prove useful in ranking the relative desirability 
of projects. 
Morlat recognizes that there is a wide range of costs which 
society undertakes to save lives. He calculates that, in France, 
$30,000 is spent per life saved in road accident prevention, and 
$800,000 to $1 million in aviation accident prevention. Such 
differences, he speculates, might not appear so scandalous if 
one recognizes that many people enjoy risk-taking, i.e. willingly 
accept higher risks in driving an auto for certain psychological 
benefits. Also, he suggests that persons are not indifferent 
to the manner in which they die, whether it bein a road accident 
or a plane accident. He cautions, however, that these divergen- 
cies may not be so acceptable once the costs are made explicit 
. to the decision-makers. Yet, Morlat considers the acceptance 
of these implicit values as representative of community 
preferences for different types of risks. He leaves aside the 
question whether such implicit values in fact reflect the psycho- 
logical phenomena of different "means of death," or rather the 
inefficiency of decision makers in making allocations. 
Sinclair (1972) suggests use of an implicit value for 
evaluating industrial safety projects. ~t is possible to determine 
the cost effectiveness of any life-saving project by examining the 
marginal expense of the 'last life saved". Such an approach, 
however, is limited to ranking those pr0ject.s with a single product, 
life-saving. It is not applicable to, say, highway improvements 
where safety is only one of the objectives. 
Starr (1969), in his article "Societal Benefit versus 
Technological Risk", attempts to uncover historical risk versus 
benefit relations for the societal and individual acceptance of 
voluntary and involuntary risks. He poses the question of what 
benefits were necessary to compensate affected individuals for 
accepting risks of death. In other words, he attempts to estimate 
both the implicit value individuals put on their own lives by 
accepting voluntary risks, and the implicit value society puts on 
social risks by preventing them. His selected risks include, 
for example, the Vietnam war, hunting, general aviation, motor 
vehicles, electric power, natural disasters, and so forth. The 
benefit is calculated by estimating money spent to participate 
in or to avoid the activity. 
Starr's general methodology has been critically reviewed 
(Otway and Cohen, 1975). What is perhaps more important than the 
results is the question of the feasibility of such a methodology 
for use in making future risk/benefit decisions. According to 
Starr, "....because this methodology is based on historical data, 
it does not serve to distinguish what is 'best' for society from 
what is traditionally acceptable" (p.1232). But in an apparent 
contradiction he later suggests: "Application of this approach 
to other areas of responsibility is self-evident. It provides 
a useful methodology for answering the question 'How safe is 
safe enough?'" (p.1237) That traditionally accepted risk/benefit 
tradeoffs can provide a rationale for making current decisions 
on safety has been accepted in much of the analysis done in the 
area of nuclear power. 
Critique 
~lthough calculation of implicit life values is useful to 
determine discrepancies in life-saving  expenditure^;^^ the use 
of these values for making decisions is considered less than 
optimal. Mishan (Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical 
Approach, 1971) criticizes this procedure for decisions which 
have been implicitly made in democratic societies. On an implicit 
value placed on life by the political process, he comments that 
the 'justification appears somewhat circular .... the idea of 
deriving quantitative values from the political process is clearly 
contrary to the idea of deriving them from an independent 
economic criterion .... By recourse to a method that refers a 
question, or part of a question, received from the political 
process back again to the political process, the economist 
appears to be concealing some deficiency in the relevant data 
or 'some weakness in the logic of the criteria'" (p.690). In 
other words, unless it is assumed that societal decisions on life- 
death tradeoffs have been made in the past according to some 
notion of optimization, such decisions should not be an input into 
current decision-making. In the words of Starr, "....it (this 
methodology) does not serve to distinguish what is 'best' for 
society. . . . " (p. 1232) . 
IV. Insurance Premiums and Court-Decided Com~ensation 
In the last section, an alternative to the human-capital 
approach, an implicit valuation of life, was reviewed. Other 
alternatives, including the amount of insurance a man purchases 
and the compensation awarded by the courts for mortality cases, 
have also been suggested and will be discussed in this section. 
Insurance Premiums 
It is sometimes suggested that some relationship exists 
between the value an individual places on his own life and the 
amount of life insurance he chooses to purchase. This relationship 
is based on the premium a man is willing to pay, and the probabi- 
lity of his being killed as a result of engaging in some specific 
activity. For example, From (1965) calculates that, in 1962, 
the probability of a passenger being killed in a plane trip was 
approximately .00017 per cent. If the passenger values his 
life at $400,000 he should be willing to pay $.68 per trip to 
reduce that probability to zero. 
However, when a passenger purchases life insurance, he does 
not actually reduce the probability of an accident. From, in the 
above example, concludes that this amount ($.68) is spent not to 
insure that a certain sum be paid to his dependents in the case 
of death, but to reduce the probability of death. The passenger 
would not necessarily pay $.68 to insure that his livelihood 
continue to accrue to his family. In fact, Mishan (1971) points 
20~ohen has estimated many more points on this "revealed 
societal preference curve". 
out that a bachelor with no dependents would have no reason to 
take out flight insurance "notwithstanding the fact that he could 
be as reluctant as th.e next man to depart this fugacious life 
at short notice" (p.691). Hence, the amount of insurance a man 
takes out reflects only his concern for his dependents, but it 
is not a measure of the value he sets on his own life. 
Court-Decided Compensation 
Court-decided compensation or jury awards have been used 
extensively as'estimates of the disbenefit of pain and suffering 
(see, for example, studies by Heaton (1971) and Peszek (1973) . 
Seldom, however, have court awards served as an estimate for 
the disbenefit of loss of life. The first mention of such a 
method for calculating life values can be found in a report by 
Thedie and Abraham (1961), in which the "price of life" 
is calculated as some arbitrary proportion of jury awards for 
pain and suffering. 
Cohen (1970) points out that a life value of $250,000 is 
"not inconsistent with recent legal awards in loss-of-life claim 
judgements" (p.13). He notes, further, that this figure is also 
"reasonably indicative of potential lifetime-earning capacity" 
(p.13). But such a relationship is not unexpected since, as 
pointed out by Carlson (1963), the human-capital or expected- 
earnings figure is o f t ~ ~  used by the court in deciding compen- 
sation for fatalities. Unfortunately, then, juries do not 
acknowledge their function of establishing incentives (see 
Calabresi (1970)). The person killed cannot be compensated 
post hoc. Hence, as Rappaport (in Hirshleifer, 1974) concludes, 
"we cannot swallow whole the results of court decisions" (p.79). 
In spite of the difficulties, the Federal Aviation 
Administration has recently suggested this approach. In a 
draft order to develop a cost/benefit method for selecting 
and ranking airport traffic control towers, the F.A.A. 
recommends a figure of $300,000 and $390,000 for an air carrier 
fatality and a general aviation fatality, respectively. These 
figures are calculated from the CAB non-Warsaw-Pact accident 
payments for the period 1966 to 1970 and extrapolated to 1974. 
V. The Risk Approach 
Most decisions to undertake projects which potentially 
save or risk lives do not deal with ex ante "identifiable" 
persons. The decision, for example, to install highway guards 
is based on a calculation of "expected lives saved", but the 
identity of the individuals is not known. In contrast, a 
decision to "save a drowning girl" or "provide a kidney 
21~olmes points out, however, that the distribution of 
compensation discriminates against the survivors of fatality 
cases because there is a lower probability of recovery for 
"income loss" than for medical expenses. 
machine" deals with identifiable persons. In the former case, 
where the recipients of a life-saving expenditure are anonymous, 
an alternative to calculating "expected lives saved" is to cal- 
culate the reduction in the probability of death for each 
affected individual. This is referred to as the "risk approach". 
This approach is applicable, again, to cost/benefit analysis. 
Probabilistic measures are substituted for expected outcomes, and 
certainty equivalents, defined as certain outcomes which are 
preferentially equivalent to probabilistic ones, are included 
in the costs. If all the outcomes or impacts of the project are 
to be reduced to a scalar measure, then the certainty equivalents 
are normally expressed in monetary terms. 
Thedie and Abraham (1961) were the first to distinguish an 
"identifiableHdeath from a "statistical" death and thus introduce 
the concept of risk. "It is impossible to weigh in the balance 
certain deaths and probable deaths, even if the latter are in 
greater number. The assessment we are going to make calls for 
anonymity and therefore, we can only deal with small risks, minor 
probabilities. When we talk of saving a human life, the question 
is really only one of avoiding a probable death, resulting from 
the multiplication of a slight probability by a large population" 
(p.591) . 
The more recent literature on the subject has also recog- 
nized this distinction. "Interest will not be centered in knowing 
the integral worth of every 'sparrow' but in knowing the value 
and cost of putting nets under 'falling sparrows'" (Carlson, 1963, 
p.3). "It is not the worth of human life that I shall discuss, 
but of 'life-saving,' of preventing death. And it is not a 
particular death, but a statistical death" (Schelling, 1967, p.127) 
"It is never the case that a specific person, or a number of 
specific persons, can be designated in advance as being those who 
are certain to be killed if a particular project is undertaken" 
(Mishan, 1971, p.639). 
The methodologies for assessing these risks of death have 
differed considerably. Thedie and Abraham caution that the 
assessment cannot be purely the outcome of objective data, but 
should be determined by a collective decision. All the economist 
can do is guide the government in making such a decision. 
However, because of the political difficulties involved in taking 
a stand on the issue, Thedie and Abraham attempt to reach a 
figure themselves. They include in the measure what they 
refer to as the "affective factors,22 one of which is the denial 
to the individual of his "desire to live." This "pretium viveda," 
or price of life, is unique to their analysis. It is an outcome 
of their attempt to.value lives ex ante, to include in the community's 
welfare the possible victim. The 1957 value of the "pretium viveda" 
22~he 'affective factors" include the following: (1) the 
sorrow caused to the victim's family; (2) the injury to the nation 
in its "imperative rule to preserve the lives of its members, 
irrespective of the advantages to be derived, and whether or not 
the persons concerned have families;" and (3) the injury to the 
individual himself by the denial of his desire to live. 
was determined to be 14,000 French Francs. As discussed in the 
last section, the derivation appears somewhat arbitrary. It is 
set in proportion to "court judgements" for pain and suffering, but 
how the proportions are determined is not discussed. This price, 
however, seems to be in no way reflective of the risk or probability 
of death. 
Schelling, on the other hand, maintains that the direct 
benefit of safety and health programs is not the value of the 
lives saved, but r~ther the value of a reduction in the statistical 
probability of death within a given population. The appropriate 
question to answer is: what is it worth to reduce the statistical 
probability of death by the amount the health or safety program 
promises? The problem then is not one of saving an identifiable 
individual but of evaluating programs which affect life expectancy 
i.e. disease prevention, safety regulation, flood control, personal 
protection, and so forth. What is it worth to decrease the risk 
of death to some identifiable group? Schelling proposes that the 
relevant value of life is, in actuality, the value of risk reduction. 
The total willingness to pay for this reduction will probably 
include, besides the individual's self interest, the interest 
of family, friends, and society. 23 
Mishan (1971a) adopts the approach suggested by Schelling-- 
that in evaluating life saving programs, the relevant benefit is 
not the expected number of lives saved but the value of reducing 
the risk of death to the relevant population. He is interested 
in deriving a value which is consistent with the principles of 
evaluation in cost/benefit analysis. As such, programs which 
involve some increased or decreased risk of death should be 
evaluated by reference to the Pareto principle--"what each member 
of the community is willing to pay or would expect to receive for 
the estimated chage of risk." Evaluations consistent with this 
principle are such that at least one person in the economy can be 
made better off, with none being made worse off24. This principle 
provides the rationale of all cost/benefit calculations. 
2 3 ~ n  a critique of Schelling's article, Gary From (1971) 
challenges the willingness-to-pay criterion as a good indicator 
in determining the proper scope and magnitude of programs to 
reduce the risk of death. Willingness to pay, according to Fromrn 
does not establish a unique value of life if the welfare function 
is unknown. He further questions willingness-to-pay as a valid 
measure because, first, individuals typically ignore the external 
social costs in making their personal decisions, and second, many 
individuals derive a positive utility from taking small risks. 
Such gambling with their life is based often on subjective, incom- 
plete and inaccurate information. 
24~he assumption is that the gainers can compensate the 
losers and there remains a net gain. Thus, there is a potential 
Pareto improvement even if this compensation is not, in fact,made. 
The relevant benefit of life-saving programs, consistent with 
the Pareto principle, is what each member of the community is 
willing to pay to avoid the r i ~ k . ~ 5  -.Nishan identifies four distinct 
types of risk to be anticipated. He first, voluntary risks, are 
relevant to projects in which the users voluntarily "purchase" 
the product and in so doing accept the risk. Insofar as the 
benefits of such projects are calculated by reference to estimates 
of consumers' surplus, no allowance need be made for additional risk 
of loss of life, since the sum each person is willing to pay is net 
of all the risks.26 However, account must be taken in the cost/ 
benefit analysis of involuntarily assumed risks (Mishan identifies 
three) . 27 These can be regarded as diseconomies external to the 
particular project or industry. The first, a direct involuntary 
risk, is the risk inflicted directly on an individual who has made 
no choice to "consume the project" or avail himself of its services. 
The second, or indirect risk, is that of infection of others, e.g., 
infection of polio. The third involuntary risk arises from the 
general concern, both financial and psychic, of other members of 
the population when one member is exposed to a certain risk of 
death. 
All involuntary risks, both direct and indirect, must be 
evaluated in terms of the sum of money necessary to compensate the 
affected persons for bearing the risk. Mishan emphasizes that 
the concept cf evaluating programs according to the Pareto 
principle is not simply an alternative to existing methods, but 
is the only economically justifiable method. 
Empirical Kork 
Both Schelling and Mishan have proposed that for the evaluation 
of a program which saves human lives, it is relevant to determine 
what it is worth to the affected population or "consumers." It 
should be their privilege to have the program if they are collectively 
willing to bear the costs. The question is how to estimate this 
willingness to pay on the part of the consumers. 
. 25~his wil!ingness to pay is derived in Mishan's analysis 
from "utility theory." In a recent article by Papp et al. (1974), 
it is suggested that utility analysis be used for evaluating 
risks of nuclear facilities. 
26~or example, in a cost/benefit analysis of the tobacco 
industry, there is no need. t-o subtract from the benefits the risk 
of lung cancer, since this risk is reflected in the demand for 
smoking. 
2 7 ~ n  example of involuntary risks is the risks assumed by 
the population adjacent to a nuclear power station. 
Schelling suggests two approaches. The first is to rely on 
market data, and the second to survey the relevant population via 
questionnaires. Both methods, according to Schelling, are 
imperfect, but he prefers the survey approach. The problem with 
the use of market data, Schelling points out, is that "market 
decisions people make (in the case of accepting risk of death) 
relate to contingencies for which the probabilities themselves are 
unknown to the consumer, sometimes barely available to the person 
who seeks the statistics, invariably applicable in only rough 
degree, and mixed with joint products that make the evidence 
ambiguous." (p.148). Schelling concedes that in the questionnaire 
approach, it is difficult for the consumer to state what it is 
worth to him to reduce the risk of death; people are not good at 
answering hypothetical questions or assessing small probabilities 
of big events. Tc avoid this problem he suggests a technique 
of scaling the risks, or making roundabout decisions on more 
easily conceivable probalistic situations, which will indirectly 
imply a preference for avoiding smaller risks. An additional 
complication is that individuals are concerned not just with 
reducing probabilities of death but also with avoiding the anxiety 
associated with anticipating such probabilities. 
Frorrm (1968), in a critique of Schelling's article, questions 
the practicability of using questionnaires. First, he notes that 
surveys which ask hypothetical questions rarely receive accurate 
responses. From's opinion is "that society is better advised 
to treat individual decisions in this area as imperfect and not 
rely on willingness to pay as the primary criterion for fixing the 
scope or magnitude of life-saving programs" (p.174). Willingness 
to pay should not be ignored completely, however, but should be used 
as a guide to the minimum and not the maximum expenditure. 
On the prospect of giving applicable and quantifiable 
measures for risk avoidance which are consistent with the Pareto 
principle, Mishan is also not so optimistic. He suggests a question- 
naire method acknowledging that the method is imperfect but that 
"the data yielded by surveys based on the questionnaire method 
are better than none, or better than data obtained by persisting 
with some current measures. ..." (p.705). 
With the exception of two informal surveys by Cohen (1970) 
and Otway (1972), there have been no substantial efforts to devise 
and implement a questionnaire approach for obtaining willingness 
to accept risk of death.28 Cohen surveyed a group of health 
physicists to determine the monetary compensation necessary for 
each to accept one rad of radiation exposure. The responses 
varied from $10 to $5,000 assuming a linear relation between 
exposure and probability of death (at some future date) with 
1,000 rads equaling the fatal dose, the implied life values ranged, 
28~appaport (1974) reports on one such survey which I have 
not had a chance to review. The report by Acton ("Evaluating 
Public Programmes to Save Lives: The Case of Heart Attacks," 
Rand Corp. Report R-950-RC, January 1973) surveys persons' 
willingness to pay for safety measures with respect to emergency 
coronary care. 
according to Cohen, from $lQ,QQQ to $5QIOOQ, Otway took a more 
indirect approach in a survey of individualsk recollections of 
catastrophic accidents. He observed from the responses that 
when the ratio of property damage to number of lives lost in a 
particular event exceeded $250,OQO, all respondents remembered 
primarily the property damage to the exclusion of life loss. 
According to Otway, "this seems to represent a subconscious 
assessment of life values at about $200,000 per life" (p.7). 
There has been only one attempt to estimate the demand for 
risk avoidance using observed market behavior. Thaler and 
Rosen (19731, in a recent article, attempt to impute a set of 
implicit marginal prices for various levels of risk by observing 
the relationship between risky jobs and wage rates. "Different 
work situations exhibit vastly different work-related probabilities 
of death and injury. Moreover, lots of data are available on 
wages in these jobs, on the personal characteristics of firms who 
offer them. Further, parties who voluntarily face such risks daily 
and as a major part of their lives or production processes have 
special interests in obtaining reliable and objective information 
about the nature of the risk involved. Finally, we have uncovered 
a new source of genuine actuarial data on death rates in risky 
occupations that until now has not been used for estimation" 
(pp.2, 3). This method of analysis is based on Adam Smith's 
ancient suggestion that individuals must be induced to take risky 
jobs through a set of compensating differences in wage rates. 
By use of regression analysis, and after tackling several 
econometric problems inherent in practically all studies which 
attempt to specify denand relationships, Thaler and Rosen estimate 
the value of life to be in the neighhourhood of $200,000 (1967). 
There are several important qualifications of this estimate. The 
most critical assumption is that individuals are aware of the 
risks when they accept certain jobs. A major theoretical problem 
is that Thaler and kosen assume linearity of risk and compensation 
(indifference functionl, and thus merely extrapolate from 
compensation for small risks to obtain a figure of $200,000 when 
the probability of death is equal to one. The approach is still 
somewhat preliminary and the figures cannot yet be considered 
operational. However, it is an important first step in the 
estimation of risk compensation relationships. 
Theoretical Work 
There appear to be many opportunities for investigating 
empirically, through the use of either questionnaire or market 
data, the risk-compensation tradeoff or individual preference 
function for risk avoidance. But, as Rappaport (in Hirshleifer, 
1974) has pointed out, before such studies are undertaken, "it 
would be well to consider what results we would expect" (p.4). 
Given certain behavioral assumptions, it is possible in theory 
to determine the individual's expected tradeoff between risk accep- 
tance and monetary compensation. There have been several recent 
attempts to model these preferences, but it is beyond the scope 
of this survey to discuss these in any detail. A more comprehensive 
review of these models can be found in a forthcoming paper by this 
author. 
A theoretical derivation of individual risk preference 
functions was first postulated by Raiffa (1969). Assuming that 
the individual is an "expected utility rnaximize~!',~~ the problem 
is to determine his willingness to reduce some probability of his 
death30 at the cost of some portion of his assets. As such, it 
fits into the more general problem of assessing utility functions 
which consist of multiple attributes--in this case, the dual 
attributes of survival probability and monetary assets. Raiffa 
develops a technique for estimating these utility functions based 
on individual responses to questions, revealing preferences 
between a certain "payoff" on the one hand, and a probabilistic 
payoff on the other hand.3i 
A slightly different approach has been developed in recent 
models by Usher (19711, Conley (1973), and Jones-Lee (1974). The 
common feature of these models is that each specifies the individual 
life-time objective function as a function of a lifetime consumption 
and survival pr~bability.~~ Both Usher and Conley d~evelop models of 
life cycle planning including the role of uncertain mortality, and 
Jones-Lee includes in addition a 'bequest motive'!33 Assuming again that 
the individual is an 'kxpected utility maximizei', the individual's 
willingness to pay (from personal consumption) for an increase in 
survival probability can be calculated by maximizing the objective 
function. Contrary to the Raiffa approach, this tradeoff or willing- 
ness to pay can then be calculated from data on life time consumption 
(without information on the individual's response to a hypothetical 
experiment). Hirshleifer (1974) points out that this "value of 
life" is formally similar to the human capital approach (discussed 
in the first section) since, in all cases, this tradeoff of assets 
- 
29~or a definition, see JDhn von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, 
"Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J., 1953. 
30~ssuming that the individual both is a "lone bachelor" and 
suffers no "anxiety" over any future impending probability of death. 
3 1 ~ f  the utility of some given survival probability P and personal 
assets A is an additive function of the utility of each, i.e. 
U (P ,A) = U (P) + U (A) , then the individual ' s utility function can be 
assessed given information on the utility of the assets, plus know- 
ledge of two (P,A) pairs for which the individual is indifferent. 
32~onley includes all activities in the objective function, 
but later expresses the "value of life" as a function of only the 
utility of consumption. 
33~oth Usher and Conley assume the "lone bachelor" case. All 
three models ignore the problem of anxiety. 
for survival probability is a function of the utility of consump- 
tion, 34 In fact, if it can be assumed that the utility of con- 
sumption exhibits diminishing marginal utility, then the traditional 
human capital approach understates willingness to pay. 
VI. Conclusions 
The four possible approaches for evaluating the "worth of a 
human lifeq' for purposes of public decision-making include the 
"human-capital" approach, an "implicit evaluation," insurance 
measures or court compensation, and the "risk" approach. According 
to the human capital approach, a lost life is viewed as a loss in 
human capital with a certain productive capacity, a proxy for 
which can be the discounted loss in future expected earnings. An 
"implicit evaluation" is based on the premise that the value of 
human life implied from past expenditures on public health or 
safety form a precedent for current evaluations. Similar precedents 
are set with court decisions awarding compensation for loss of life, 
providing for the loss to the dependents. Court decisions are thus 
related to "optimal" insurance decisions which provide for the 
dependents, and consequently have also been suggested as a method 
for evaluating loss in human life. A final approach is to evaluate 
programs which affect human mortality, not by statistical expectations, 
but in accordance with the monetary sum necessary to compensate the 
population for accepting a certain probability of a possible death, 
the "certainty equivalent". 
The most interesting points revealed by this survey can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) The human capital approach, originally developed for 
purposes of calculating "optimal" insurance, reflects 
only that amount of an individual's potential future 
income accruing to others, the "net" value, or accruing 
both to others and to himself, the "gross" value. 
Originally, it served as an approximation to the ex post 
"societal loss" from accidents or diseases; later, 
because of the ease in its quantification, it was 
adopted as an ex ante value of avoiding accidents or 
diseases. It is currently, in the United States and in 
the context of cost/benefit analysis, the most popular 
method for quantifying the benefits of life-saving 
programs. For this purpose it has been criticized by 
economists as inappropriate, violating the conditions 
for efficient decisions which serve as the basic rationale 
of the cost/benefit methodology. 
34~his conclusion follows directly from the specification of 
the objective function as dependent only on consumption and sur- 
vival probability. Its appropriateness is discussed in Linnerooth 
(1975). 
2) An "implicit" value of human life, calculated from past 
public decisions which potentially affected human 
mortality, originally served only to demonstrate the 
inefficiency of such decisions. But another perspective, 
suggested in the French literature, is to consider such 
decisions as reflecting not inefficiency, but divergent 
preferences for the "manner in which one dies." It has 
thus been recently advocated by some as a possible 
approach for making current public decisions, but its 
appropriateness is still subject to debate. 
3) Both court-decided compensation for loss of life and 
optimal life insurance decisions reflect the individual's 
will to provide appropriate compensation to the dependents 
for their loss in income as a result of the death, they 
are equivalent to the human-capital approach. 
4) The evaluation of a public program which increases 
(decreases) human mortality, ignoring the statistical 
expectation of lives saved (lost) and concentrating only 
on the reduction (increase) in the risk of death, is 
termed the "risk approach." Appropriate within the 
context of a cost/benefit analysis (sometimes referred 
to as benefitjrisk analysis) it eliminates, on the 
part of the decision-maker, the necessity to define an 
absolute "value of life". The appropriate benefit 
(or cost) is not the value of a life saved but becomes 
the value of reducing the probability (usually small) of 
loss of life. The assumption is that preferences 
for risk reduction are not linear. Several attempts, 
by both opinion sampling and econometric techniques with 
market data, have been made to estimate these preferences, 
but the results are not conclusive. There have been some 
recent efforts to model, given certain behavioral axioms, 
an individual's preferences for risk avoidance. 
It is hoped that this survey has clarified the various 
methodologies for evaluatinq programs which change human mortality, 
and that it will serve as an introduction to current efforts 
by the Joint IAEA/IIASA Project to quantify life values. The 
question of evaluating risk to human life is part of a broader 
question of the public acceptance of large-scale technologies and 
the importance of socio-psychological mechanisms in the acceptance 
of technological risks (see Otway, 1975). A primary objective of the 
Joint Project is to gain an improved understanding of how societies 
judge the acceptability of new technologies and how societal attitudes, 
and anticipated responses, may be integrated into the decision-making 
process. In this context, societal response to risks related to 
mortality will be evaluated, both theoretically and empirically. 
The results will be an important input into current IIASA efforts 
comparing energy options and setting "optimal" standards. 
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